I. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to investigate and discuss the key corporate governance mechanisms and its effect on financial performance of the Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) in India. The idea is to identify the specific governance mechanisms such as board size, proportion of independent, international and skilled directors, independent audit committees and separation of role of CEO and Board Chairman, which help the firms improve their financial performance.
Since last decade, research on microfinance firms has gained pace, reflecting increasing interest on the business of providing financial services (credit, savings, insurance, remittance and payments) to the working poor of the world, especially in developing countries. Microfinance has emerged as a potent tool to alleviate poverty and has been feted by the development sector. Along with increase in popularity of microfinance, the concern among investors and donors for better corporate governance has also increased. As the microfinance business scaled up and attendant commercialization of microfinance took place, the need for a systematic approach to Corporate Governance has been felt. Numerous industry led studies and consulting reports have recommended a set of governance practices to achieve the financial and social objectives of the firm. But the recommendations have not been country specific and not entirely based on empirical evidence. There is evidence that different types of regulatory regimes have distinct implications on the cost of operations and varying effects on the profitability and outreach of 
II. Literature Review Part 1: Theoretical framework
Corporate Governance of the firms has been studied under the lens of the Principal-Agent relationship of The Agency Theory. The Principal-Agent problem in the firm's context is defined 2 as "the problem arising when agents (firm's managers) pursue their own goals rather than the goals of principal (shareholders)". It assumes that the managers are self interested individuals whose incentives are not aligned to the wealth creation goals of the shareholders.
Agency theory is the theoretical framework that has been a handy tool to explain the dynamics of the relationship between the board directors who represent the shareholders and the management. Bhagat and Black (1999) investigate the correlation between the board characteristics (presence and proportion of independent directors and size of the board) and financial performance of US public companies. 8 The empirical evidence points to non correlation between the presence of independent directors in the board and the financial performance. The study also finds no relationship between board size and financial performance.
The study of banks in Nigeria indicate that the board size does affect the financial performance, although negatively and independent directors are found to have a positive and significant effect on the financial performance. As per the Grameen Foundation, risk due to lapses in corporate governance is one of the top ten They compromised board independence by appointing close family members in the board, even though the firms were initially donor funded non-profit entities. The boards had international directors and other external directors but they were passive to the prevalent corporate governance practices and failed to prevent expropriation by the management.
As per the agency theory and current industry literature, the board must retain independence from the management, especially when the management is run by a charismatic promoter, who can dominate the board and may be difficult to fire. In case of larger MFIs in India, the above mentioned study has indicated that promoter led management can be entrenched and be detrimental to the interests of stakeholders. But does this hold for small Indian MFI too? Jensen and Fama found that small firms can benefit from CEO/Chairman duality from quick decision making through better board and management coordination.
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In the microfinance literature, the CEO/Chairman duality has been found to be a significant factor for a positive financial performance. Mersland and Strom (2009) 22 found that the duality increases the portfolio yield and the outreach (number of clients) but has no effect on RoA (Return on Assets) of the firms. A subsequent study by Hartarska & Mersland (2012) 23 with a similar data set concludes that the duality of CEO and Board Chairman position increases the volume and number of loans. The arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. CEO and chairman duality does not lead to superior decisions and better MFI performance.
Agency theory considers the board independence and its leadership a critical success factor for the firms and a mitigating factor for excessive risks. In microfinance industry where the loans are 21 Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. "Separation of ownership and control." Journal of law and economics (1983): 301-325. of shorter tenor (1 to 2 years) and can go bad very quickly, the senior management is always under pressure to maintain a tight vigil against defaults and at the same time achieve the growth.
As the case of Sahayata Microfinance (Box 1) indicates, the senior management can suppress the information about the financials performance. The board's independent supervision and leadership of the management therefore is critical for transparency and to balance the trade-off between the risk taking for higher growth and risk management. Hartarska (2005) 24 , Bassam Microfinance practitioners and academicians have been advocating certain measures for a stronger risk management system. The recommendations include, higher proportion of independent directors in the audit committee, internal auditors and risk management team reporting directly to the board's audit committee instead of the management. It is expected that the independent audit committees are essential for detecting and controlling the financial mismanagement and therefore achieve good financial performance. The study is focused on the 'for profit' or regulated non-banking financial firms for the following reason: regulated and shareholder owned firms have governance structures that are similar to a traditional financial firm, that there is a separation of ownership and management, cooperatives don't have such an ownership structure while non-profit microfinance organizations have non microfinance developmental projects that may be cross subsidized through microfinance operations. As per the CRISIL rating agency of India, the legal form and related regulatory requirements have a bearing on the governance practices and transparency.
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Empirical studies have also shown that the legal form of a firm is an important factor for The MFIs covered under the study, show better performance compared to the overall dataset of Indian MFIs on the financial parameters and is comparable performance to the global average.
The average OSS for the MFIs under study is 108% (Graph 5 and Table 2 ) compared to less than 100% for rest of India (since 2011) and around 100% for rest of the world. The average RoE for MFIs in the sample study is 2.9% (Graph 6 and Table 2 ) compared to the median RoE of Indian
MFIs that range from 6.5% to 10% with a declining asset size, confirming the effect of decline of microfinance on the financial health of MFIs in the state of Andhra Pradesh. Most of the MFIs in the study operated both rural and urban branches, are on average 7 years old, with an average of 7-8 board members, 35% independent directors, 13% international directors and 21% of directors with banking experience (Table 3) . A total of 66% of the boards had an independent auditor reporting to the board directly ( Table 3) 
Empirical model
The empirical model specified in equation below is broadly based on (Hartarska, 2005) 
Y it = constant + α B it + βF it + ε it eq. (1) Where Y it is a dependent variable for financial performance of firm 'i' at time't', B it captures board variable of firm 'i' at time 't' and 'F it ' captures the firm level variables. Since the study is only on one country's data, country specific macroeconomic variables have not been considered.
The dependent variables for financial performance are; Return on Equity (RoE), Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS) and Yield on Portfolio. RoE measures the overall profitability to the shareholders, the yield measures the profitability at the loan portfolio level and OSS measures the financial sustainability of the lending operations.
The regression on panel data has been done using Random Effects estimation method since the panel data has time invariant governance variables; the independent variables such as board characteristics and lending methodology don't vary much over a period of three to four years.
Therefore, fixed effects method is unsuitable for such a data. The independent variables to capture board level effects (B it ) are; audit committee reporting to the board, board size, presence of a former banker, proportion of international-nominee directors and independent directors in the board. The dummy variables have been assigned for 'audit committee reporting to the board';
MFIs with an audit committee have been assigned 1 and MFIs with no audit committee have been assigned 0 dummy variable.
37 Hartarska, V. (2005) A number of firm's characteristics can potentially be associated with its financial performance (RoE/OSS/Portfolio Yield) 38 ; therefore firm level control variables have been included to reduce potential omitted variable bias. The log of asset size (ln asset size) has been added to control for the effect of size of loan portfolio on the financial performance. The 'MFI age' variable is included to capture the effect of number of years of operations that may have facilitated stable and profitable operations. The control variable of CEO experience is a proxy for the managerial and leadership skills that would be helpful in successful execution of the strategy, leading to a favorable financial outcome.
V. Results and Discussion
The independent variable, Duality of CEO-Board Chairman role has been dropped due to its low statistical significance.
The values for constant in all the equations (Table 4 ) are significant and large; indicating that information from some unobserved variables is being captured. As per the Wald statistical test, the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero, in every specification, can be rejected.
Therefore, model can be used to analyze the effect of some of the explanatory variables on the dependent variables.
Return on Equity (RoE) -Variables of Board size and 'ex-banker' board member are significant in the regression at the 95% confidence interval and with an R 2 of 48%.
38 Refer to Table 3 for definition As per the regression result (Table 4) , a larger board is expected to negatively affect the return on equity (RoE). An increase in the number of board members by one individual is expected to reduce the return on equity by 1.48%. This seems counterintuitive but a possible explanation can be that the independent directors and/or nominee directors free ride and do not bring any incremental skills to the business of microfinance that can enhance the returns to equity or a larger board finds it difficult to come to consensus and is slow in decision making. Usually, the non-profit MFIs in India strive to transform themselves into a 'for profit' legal status after they reach a certain scale 39 . In this study, the average age of MFIs is 7.25 years ( Table 1 ) and for few MFIs in the data, this time period includes the event of transformation into a 'for profit' legal status. As an MFI transforms from a 'non-profit' to a 'for profit' legal status, its regulatory compliance burden board size and composition (example: minimum number of independent directors) substantially increases without simultaneous increase in the size of the loan assets. microfinance institution. The relevant technical skills that can be critical to a microfinance firm are; product development, understanding of prudential norms for a credit portfolio and ability to bring human capital from one's professional network.
Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS) -Presence of a former commercial banker in the board has a significant and large effect on the OSS, every such additional member is expected to increase the OSS by 30%. When the board size of the MFIs increases by one member it is expected to reduce the OSS by 2.3%. Though not a large effect, it may indicate a trade-off between oversight and efficiency.
Yield on loan portfolio -Presence of international directors shows a small but negative effect of 3.4% on the portfolio yield regression. This is puzzling as it is expected that international directors would bring in best practices into the firm and that would add to the firm value. An explanation for this could be that the inclusion of an international director happens at the initial stages of the growth of MFI, post transformation from a 'non profit' to a 'for profit' entity and that may accompany increased costs related to hiring, training and adoption of new information systems. This result however is similar to the finding Mersland & Strom (2009) 42 where the presence of an international director has an inverse relationship with the profitability of the MFIs. 
General Firm Level Control Variables

Joint 'F' test
The joint test for significance of independent variables in groups was done for board variables as a group and for firm level variables as a group. The null hypothesis that the coefficients of the board variables are zero could be rejected in the 'F' test ( Table 6 ). The board variables are jointly significant and have an impact on the dependent variables (firm performance), implying that the model is correctly specified. The firm level variables (MFI years of existence, size of the loan assets, lending methodology and CEO's experience) however, don't seem to have a joint explanatory power for the variation in firm's performance ( Table 7) .
Correlations
None of the independent variables grouped under the board characteristics are strongly correlated.
Only the following variables are correlated to a moderate degree: CEO's experience-asset size, CEO experience-MFI age, Asset Size-Board size.
Multicollinearity
As per a thumb rule (Kennedy, 2008) , if the correlation between the independent variables is less than 70% then the problem of multicollinearity can be assumed to be negligible. The minimal effect of multicollinearity (Table 2) indicates that each significant variable is not being affected by its covariates and has an individual explanatory power over the dependent variable.
VI. Conclusion
In the context of Indian MFIs, board characteristics have been found to be important levers of financial performance. This thesis underlines the need for investors, donors and founders in the microfinance sector in India to continuously seek to refine governance practices and not adopt a standardized template of the so called global best practices or practices of the corporate sector.
Impact of the following Corporate Governance practices on financial performance was evaluated:
Board size, Proportion of independent and international directors, presence of audit committee reporting to the board and proportion of skilled directors.
The study indicates that the separation of CEO and the Board Chairman does not have a statistically significant effect on the financial performance of MFIs. Increase in the Board size has a negative effect on the profitability. Presence of international directors surprisingly has a negative impact on the portfolio yield of MFIs and no significant effect on the other measures of the financial performance.
Skilled board members have the most significant and positive effect on the financial performance of firms under study. Microfinance industry all over the world, including in India has its roots in the non-profit sector. Still today, microfinance faces challenges to attract the kind of human capital that can make MFIs competitive financial services firms; in such a situation a skillful director's role becomes crucial in enhancing the performance of the MFIs.
board would be more likely to be better informed than an international investor in a distant land.
This study however does not suggest that the board independence can be ignored by the MFIs or its investors but it implies that the priority must be given to the skills of the directors and on an optimal size of the board, especially during the growth stage of the MFI.
Firm profitability and long term survivability although intertwined are the two different measures of success of a firm. In the short term, concentration of power and decision making in the founder-CEO may help in reducing the turnaround time for decision making but in the long run investors should evaluate whether management is influencing board's decision making and if that is having any adverse effect on the financial sustainability of the MFI.
Future studies can focus on country level data as the aggregated Global MFI data or a cross country data may skew the average characteristics in favor of the countries that have more MFIs in the dataset. This study utilized a small dataset that was publicly available and the result could be different if a larger dataset with primary data of Indian MFIs is used. 
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